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NO. 53 DECEMBER 2018 Introduction 
New Connectivity in the Bay of Bengal 
Opportunities and Perspectives of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) 
Christian Wagner and Siddharth Tripathi 
Owing to the increased commitment from India, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has experienced a 
revival since 2016. Firstly, India is hoping to be able to develop better the country’s 
hard-to-reach northeast by intensifying regional cooperation. Secondly, given the 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments in neighbouring countries, it aims 
to reinforce its claim to leadership in the region. From an international perspective, 
BIMSTEC is an essential building block in India’s Act East policy in the context of the 
renewed importance of the Indo-Pacific region. With the support of BIMSTEC, Ger-
many and the European Union (EU) can deepen their strategic partnership with India 
whilst simultaneously increasing their visibility in the Bay of Bengal. 
 
BIMSTEC was founded in 1997 as BIST-EC 
(Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
Economic Cooperation). After Myanmar 
joined later that year, it was renamed 
BIMSTEC. The entry of Nepal and Bhutan in 
2004 required yet another change of name. 
The aim of the organisation was to promote 
economic cooperation between countries 
bordering the Bay of Bengal. 
The member states of BIMSTEC have very 
different experiences with regional coopera-
tion. Thailand and Myanmar are members 
of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), considered a successful 
regional organisation. Intraregional trade 
among ASEAN member states currently 
accounts for approximately 29 percent of 
their total trade in goods. ASEAN has also 
established multilateral security institu-
tions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 
order to involve major external powers in 
the region. 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal are 
members of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which is 
considered a rather unsuccessful model of 
regional cooperation in Asia. Intraregional 
trade is at a mere seven percent. Indo-Pak 
conflicts have repeatedly hampered the 
organisation’s development. As a result, 
there has been no appreciable regional 
cooperation in South Asia. 
The seven member states of BIMSTEC 
have a total population of around 1.5 billion 
people. Although this represents 22 percent 
of the world’s population, around 90 per-
cent of them live in India. Their combined 
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gross domestic product (GDP) comes to a 
total of 2.7 trillion US dollars. The econom-
ic growth of BIMSTEC countries has been at 
6.5 percent for the last five years. 
The development of BIMSTEC was initial-
ly sluggish as its members received little 
political attention and the organisation had 
weak institutional structures. Initially, it 
was to hold a high-level meeting every two 
years. However, only four summits have 
taken place so far (Bangkok in 2004, New 
Delhi in 2008, Nay Pyi Taw in 2014 and 
Kathmandu in 2018). Member states have 
so far not been able to agree on a free trade 
agreement. Intraregional trade, therefore, 
stands at just under five percent. However, 
the foreign and trade ministers of partici-
pating states meet regularly to discuss co-
operation projects. At the 2014 summit, 
they decided to set up a secretariat which 
started work in Dhaka that same year. The 
number of working groups has now in-
creased from six to 14. 
India’s Initiative 
The new attention BIMSTEC has received in 
recent years is largely due to an increased 
commitment from New Delhi. As recently 
as 2015, some voices in India were critical 
of BIMSTEC’s prospects. Two developments 
may have been decisive for a reassessment 
of the organisation. Firstly, relations with 
Pakistan have continued to deteriorate. At 
the end of December 2015, Prime Minister 
Modi unexpectedly visited his Pakistani 
counterpart Nawaz Sharif, raising hopes of 
a renewed rapprochement. However, these 
hopes were dashed after a terrorist attack 
in the Indian city of Pathankot in January 
2016. Secondly, during this period, the 
Chinese government began presenting vari-
ous cooperation projects already underway, 
such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myan-
mar Economic Corridor (BCIM), as part of its 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since India is 
one of the few countries in Asia to refuse to 
participate in the BRI, the government in 
New Delhi subsequently showed little inter-
est in the BCIM project. 
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In mid-October 2016, the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, South Africa) summit 
took place in Goa, India. At India’s behest, 
the BRICS meeting was combined with an 
outreach meeting with the heads of state of 
the BIMSTEC countries. The Indian govern-
ment took this opportunity to present 
BIMSTEC as an alternative to the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). In September 2016, following a 
terrorist attack on a military base in Indian 
Kashmir, the New Delhi government can-
celled its participation in the upcoming 
SAARC summit in Pakistan. Other SAARC 
states such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan and Nepal supported India’s deci-
sion. India also invited the Maldives and 
Afghanistan as observers to the BRICS 
BIMSTEC summit. These two countries are 
members of SAARC but not of BIMSTEC. In 
their final document, BIMSTEC’s heads of 
state and government condemned terrorism 
and declared a willingness to cooperate 
more closely on security policy, a statement 
which, according to all observers, was clear-
ly directed against Pakistan. 
Since 2016, BIMSTEC has recorded a 
number of positive developments: in 
August of that year, the BIMSTEC Transport 
and Connectivity Working Group (BTCWG) 
was launched. In 2017, the Thai govern-
ment submitted a draft for the BIMSTEC 
Master Plan for Connectivity. Member states 
are currently negotiating agreements to 
promote coastal shipping and road trans-
port. An agreement on improving customs 
clearance has already been signed. There is 
a Memorandum of Understanding on ex-
panding cross-border power grids. Finally, 
members agreed to strengthen security 
cooperation by, among other things, setting 
up regular meetings between interior 
ministers and security apparatus repre-
sentatives. However, India’s interest in 
closer security cooperation of this kind 
has already suffered initial setbacks. Nepal 
and Thailand, for example, only sent ob-
servers to India for BIMSTEC’s first joint 
military manoeuvre in September 2018. 
Observers concluded that Nepal’s refusal 
to take part was directly due to political 
pressure being exerted on Kathmandu by 
Beijing. As a result, Nepal and Thailand 
subsequently conducted joint manoeuvres 
instead. 
New interest in BIMSTEC 
BIMSTEC allows India to combine impor-
tant domestic, regional and international 
aspects of its foreign policy. Domestically, 
increased connectivity in northeastern 
India should also improve access to the 
region. Currently, the region can only be 
reached via an approximately 20-kilometre-
wide corridor between Bangladesh and 
Nepal. China has laid claim to the area’s 
northernmost state of Arunachal Pradesh 
for decades. At the same time, a number of 
militant groups in the northeast are fight-
ing for greater autonomy and, in some 
cases, independence. The region has long 
been considered a land bridge for closer 
cooperation with Southeast Asia and 
ASEAN. Since the early 1990s, successive 
Indian governments have pursued a “Look 
East” policy which Prime Minister Modi 
upgraded to an “Act East” policy after 2014. 
In addition to the northeast itself, improved 
economic development, stimulated in con-
junction with neighbouring states in the 
Bay of Bengal, would probably also benefit 
the approximately 300 million people liv-
ing in the states on India’s east coast. 
Secondly, BIMSTEC also gives India the 
opportunity to counter China’s growing in-
fluence in the region with its own connec-
tivity projects. Traditionally, China has 
strong military and economic ties with 
Myanmar and, in recent years, has invested 
heavily in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka 
as part of the BRI. BIMSTEC is more attrac-
tive to India than SAARC, for example, 
where the conflict with Pakistan has re-
peatedly blocked progress. In addition, 
Southeast Asia and ASEAN are more bene-
ficial partners for India from a political and 
economic point of view than neighbouring 
countries in South Asia. 
The organisation has also become more 
critical for other BIMSTEC members. In re-
 SWP Comment 53 
December 2018 
4 
cent years, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy dis-
cussions have focused less on South Asia 
and more on new initiatives, such as the 
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) or 
BIMSTEC. The Himalayan states of Nepal 
and Bhutan see BIMSTEC as a welcome 
opportunity to diversify their trade routes. 
Bangladesh hopes the cooperation project 
will improve its relations with Southeast 
Asia, although bilateral issues such as the 
expulsion of the Rohingyas from Myanmar 
will not be discussed in this context. Thai-
land also has an interest in deepening its 
relations with South Asia and, among other 
things, is working with BIMSTEC to improve 
networking between the region’s port cities. 
BIMSTEC, Germany and the EU 
The BIMSTEC cooperation has received a 
clear political impetus in recent years, even 
though specific results so far have been 
rather modest. Nevertheless, BIMSTEC is 
still important for German and European 
policies towards Asia because strengthening 
regional cooperation or connectivity has 
been one of their key concerns for many 
years. 
Due to the clear predominance of Chi-
nese investments, many regional coopera-
tion projects are currently losing their at-
tractiveness for members. The investments 
are increasing trade policy, financial and 
political dependency on China. The EU con-
tinues to promote regional cooperation in 
its connectivity strategy with Asia pub-
lished in the autumn of 2018. It will focus 
on constructing transport, energy and digi-
tal networks. BIMSTEC is also prioritising 
these areas. In addition, Germany and India 
could deepen their strategic partnership 
through closer cooperation within the 
BIMSTEC framework. India is now willing 
to work with other countries on such pro-
jects, as the India and Japan Vision 2025 
shows. BIMSTEC also wants to open up to 
cooperation with international organisa-
tions. Finally, Germany and the EU could 
increase their visibility in the Indo-Pacific 
region with the support of BIMSTEC. 
As for other regional organisations, the 
challenge for BIMSTEC is to provide tangi-
ble financial and human resources, and not 
just make well-intentioned proposals. The 
secretariat has only had a rather small bud-
get and little equipment and personnel, to 
date. Germany and Europe have a wealth of 
expertise in both areas. Given the above-
mentioned negative implications that the 
BRI could have on regional cooperation 
projects, it should also be in the interests of 
German and European policy to support a 
revitalised organisation like BIMSTEC. 
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